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A CLASH OF TWO COURTS:  BAKER, FULL FAITH AND 
CREDIT, AND MONTANA’S REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE A 




The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution is 
one of the most important, but least understood, constitutional clauses.  
Together with the principles of res judicata, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
generally ensures that a final judgment in one state has binding and 
preclusive effect all over the country.  In Baker v. General Motors Corp., 
decided in 1998, the Supreme Court threw a wrinkle in Full Faith and 
Credit Clause jurisprudence when the majority held that a state need not 
enforce a judgment of another state when the judgment “interfere[s] with 
litigation over which the ordering State had no authority.”  This broad 
statement questioned the Court’s longstanding conclusion that there is no 
public policy exception to affording full faith and credit to another state’s 
judgment.  This article explores the Baker holding in the context of two 
competing lawsuits which culminated in contradictory decisions of the 
North Dakota and Montana Supreme Courts.  The article concludes that the 
Montana Supreme Court erred when it refused to give preclusive effect to a 
North Dakota declaratory judgment. Because Baker is overbroad and 
confusing, the Court should clarify its holding the next opportunity that 
arises in order to prevent future courts from refusing to give preclusive 
effect to another state’s judgment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mention the term “res judicata” to an ordinary third-year law student, 
and you are likely to experience plenty of glazed eyes and head scratching.  
The student may be able to point back to his first-year Civil Procedure class 
as the source of his vague recollection that res judicata is important.  If you 
mention the term “full faith and credit” to a third-year law student, you are 
almost certain to get a blank stare.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the 
United States Constitution typically does not find its way into first-year 
constitutional law courses.  Unless the student took a course on conflicts of 
law, it is likely he has no concept what the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
says, and it is even less likely he knows what it means. 
It is troublesome that more attorneys do not graduate law school with a 
deeper understanding of res judicata and full faith and credit, because they 
are deeply important legal concepts that have practical litigation value.1  
This article seeks to provide:  (1) a brief overview of res judicata, 
particularly the subcategories of issue and claim preclusion; (2) a 
foundational understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the 
United States Supreme Court’s most recent interpretation of the clause in 
Baker v. General Motors Corp.; and (3) a description of declaratory 
judgments and their preclusive effect in other litigation.  Using the 
framework of the discussion of res judicata, full faith and credit, and 
declaratory judgments, I critically evaluate two dueling cases in the North 
Dakota and Montana Supreme Courts.2  In Wamsley II, the Montana 
Supreme Court refused to enforce a North Dakota declaratory judgment, 
largely relying on a supposed exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
confusingly decided in Baker.  I argue that the Montana Supreme Court 
took Baker beyond its breaking point.3  The decision in Wamsley II proves 
that Justice Kennedy was correct in his concurrence in Baker that the 
majority’s sloppy reasoning would provide later courts with an opportunity 
to enlarge the exceptions to full faith and credit. 
 
1. Not to mention pecuniary consequences.  Full faith and credit was worth $400,000 to 
Nodak Mutual in its dispute with the Wamsley heirs.  This dispute will be discussed in great depth 
below. 
2. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wamsley (hereinafter “Wamsley I”), 2004 ND 174, 687 N.W.2d 
226; Wamsley v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. (hereinafter “Wamsley II”), 2008 MT 56, 341 Mont. 467, 
178 P.3d 102. 
3. One of the reasons for my interest in the subject matter of this article is that I am a native 
North Dakotan. 
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II. RES JUDICATA 
The term “res judicata” literally means, “a thing adjudicated.”4  
Unfortunately, this rather simple definition does not express much, if 
anything, about the great many contours5 res judicata has in practice.6  
While res judicata encompasses many challenging and scholarly sub-issues, 
such as offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel,7 for purposes of this 
article, I will only be discussing res judicata in terms of claim preclusion 
and issue preclusion. 
Claim preclusion precludes a party from re-litigating a claim that has 
already been decided by a valid and final judgment.8  This is because “[t]he 
judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits 
concludes the parties and privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a 
new action or suit involving the same cause of action either before the same 
or any other tribunal.”9  A simple example illustrates how claim preclusion 
typically works.10  Assume there is a car accident (which we shall call “the 
accident”), involving Driver A and Driver B.  Driver A sues Driver B in 
state court for damages allegedly arising out of the accident.  After scores of 
depositions, interrogatories, and the like, the court issues a valid and final 
judgment for Driver A that includes an award of damages.  Driver A now 
has a new claim on the judgment, meaning she can enforce the judgment in 
the rendering court or another court, but the final judgment terminates 
Driver A’s ability to later sue Driver B under the same claim.  Similarly, a 
valid and final judgment from the court that Driver B is not liable for the 
alleged damages bars Driver A from pursuing another action against Driver 
B on the same claim.11 
 
4 A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 763 (2d ed. 1995). 
5. One leading scholar has written “[t]he simplistic statement of res judicata is so devoid of 
objective standards that any attempt to apply the statement to a given set of facts poses great 
difficulties.”  ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION 13 (1969). 
6. A more helpful starting point is to think of res judicata as “specif[ying] the effect that any 
adjudication has on all subsequent litigation.”  ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES 
JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 3 (2001). 
7.  Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV. 63, 76 
(1988) (describing offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel as a plaintiff's ability to use a prior 
judgment against a defendant as preclusive, even if the plaintiff was not a party in the prior 
lawsuit). 
8. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 11. 
9. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 926 (2009).  See also VESTAL, supra note 5, at 43 (“Res judicata, in 
the sense of claim preclusion, exists when a litigant has brought an action, an adjudication has 
occurred, and he is foreclosed from further litigation on the claim.”). 
10. The following example is borrowed, with gratitude, from David L. Shapiro, a leading 
Civil Procedure scholar at Harvard Law School.  See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 22-23, 32-33 (2001). 
11. SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 32-33.  Shapiro relies on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982) (hereinafter RSJ) for the premise that: 
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Issue preclusion, on the other hand, precludes either party from 
subsequently litigating any issue of fact or law that was actually litigated 
and determined in the initial action “if the determination was essential to a 
valid and final judgment.”12  Put slightly differently: 
[a]ny right, fact, or matter in issue, and directly adjudicated on, or 
necessarily involved in, the determination of an action before a 
competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the 
merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot 
again be litigated between the parties and privies . . . whether or 
not the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two 
suits is the same.13 
Returning to the hypothetical involving Driver A and Driver B, 
suppose Driver B pleads in his answer that Driver A was contributorily 
negligent, thus precluding Driver A from recovering some or all of her 
damages.  The court rules that Driver A was in fact not negligent.  Later, 
Driver B sues Driver A for injuries that Driver B sustained in the same car 
accident, alleging that Driver A was negligent.  Since this issue was already 
litigated and decided, Driver B is precluded from re-litigating the issue in 
the second action.14 
To paraphrase John the Apostle, there are countless other things that 
could be written about res judicata, and if they were written, the world itself 
might not be able to contain the pages.15  For purposes of this article, 
however, it is sufficient to understand the basic role of claim preclusion and 
issue preclusion in subsequent litigation.  In summary, claim preclusion 
precludes a party from re-litigating a claim that has already been decided by 
a valid and final judgment, and issue preclusion precludes either party from 
subsequently litigating any issue of fact or law which has actually been 
litigated, determined, and was essential to a valid and final judgment. 
 
[a] valid and final personal judgment is conclusive between the parties, except on 
appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:  (1) a judgment for the plaintiff 
merges the plaintiff's claim in the judgment and normally gives him a new claim on 
the judgment; and (2) a judgment for the defendant operates to bar a second action on 
the same claim. 
Id.  In the example regarding Driver A and Driver B, if Plaintiff A wins, then (1) takes effect; if 
Defendant B wins, then (2) takes effect. 
12 CASAD & CLERMONT., supra note 6, at 11. 
13. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 926 (2009).  See also RSJ § 17(3):  “A judgment in favor of either 
the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in a subsequent action between them on the same or a 
different claim, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was 
essential to that judgment[.]” 
14. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 115.  See also SHAPIRO, supra note 10, at 49.  
15. John 21:25 (English Standard Version) (“Now there are also many other things that Jesus 
did.  Were every one of them to be written, I suppose that the world itself could not contain the 
books that would be written.”). 
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III. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been called by one former 
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court the “lawyer’s clause” 
of the Constitution.16  Full faith and credit has two components:  (1) the 
constitutional clause, and (2) the federal statutes implemented pursuant to 
the clause.  The Full Faith and Credit Clause provides:  “Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records and judicial 
proceedings of every other state.  And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.”17  Congress has used its power to enforce 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause on four occasions.18  Of greatest 
importance to this article is Congress’ first use of its enforcement power, 
now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which states in pertinent part: 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so 
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in every 
court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions 
as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory 
or Possession from which they are taken.19 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, together with 28 U.S.C. § 1738, 
essentially ensures that the principles of res judicata apply across state 
lines.20  Thus, once a final and properly authenticated judgment from state 
 
16. ROBERT H. JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE LAWYER'S CLAUSE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 3 (1945).  Justice Jackson thought this because the clause is “concerned with the 
techniques of the law,” and in every day practice, lawyers are deeply concerned with technique.  
Id. at 4. 
17. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
18. William L. Reynolds, The Story of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 41 MD. B.J. 34, 39 
(2008).  Of current political and social interest is the most recent use by Congress to enforce the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause by passing the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 28 U.S.C. § 
1738C.  The Supreme Court recently struck down § 3 of DOMA, which defined “marriage,” for 
purposes of federal law, as a legal union between one man and one woman.  United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013).  The Court held that § 3 of DOMA violated the Fifth 
Amendment rights of individuals who are joined in lawful same-sex marriages.  Id. The Court did 
not decide whether § 2 of DOMA, which authorizes the states to refuse to give effect to same-sex 
marriages celebrated in another state, is constitutional.  But it is only a matter of time before the 
Court does decide this issue.  All this goes to show that full faith and credit deeply impacts law 
and society. 
19 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).  The first two sentences of § 1738 describe how to authenticate 
the records and prove their authentication in court.  The final sentence, quoted above, states the 
effect that the judgment has once authenticated and proven. 
20. For the purposes of this article, we are concerned only with the res judicata effect that a 
judgment rendered in one state court has in a subsequent proceeding in a state court across state 
lines.  Even though we are only concerned with state-state relations, it is important to note that 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 “imposes a judgment enforcement mandate on 'every court within the United States 
and its Territories and Possessions,' necessarily including enforcements performed state-to-state, 
between states and United States territories, state-to-federal, and federal-to-state.”  James P. 
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one has been filed in state two, it is entitled to full faith and credit in state 
two and must be given the same effect in state two as the judgment would 
have under state one’s law or usage.21  In other words, each state must “give 
to a judgment at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be 
accorded in the State which rendered it.”22 
That the res judicata effect of a judgment applies across state lines is 
essential not only to the working of the Full Faith and Credit Clause but 
also to the smooth workings of the entire judiciary.23  The United States 
Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the clause was to: 
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign 
sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the 
laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make 
them integral parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy 
upon a just obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective 
of the state of its origin.24 
The credit owed a sister-state judgment is exacting, and since at least 
the early twentieth century with the decision in Fauntleroy v. Lum,25 there 
has been no public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
regarding judgments.26  Therefore, even if a judgment rendered in state one 
 
George, Enforcing Judgments Across State and National Boundaries: Inbound Foreign Judgments 
and Outbound Texas Judgments, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 399, 405 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1738). 
21.  Id. at 405-06.  See also CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 213 (“When the prior 
judgment was rendered by a state court and the second action is brought in a court of another state, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution requires the second court to give the 
same effect to a valid and final judgment as the judgment would have in the courts of the 
rendering state.”); Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and the American Federal System, 55 
WAYNE L. REV. 1487, 1538-39 (2009) (“Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause then, a final 
judgment on the merits rendered by a state court or a federal court must be recognized by another 
state court or federal court, subject only to the following exceptions.”  Professor Sedler then goes 
on to list the four narrow exceptions to full faith and credit, none of which are important to our 
discussion); VESTAL, supra note 5, at 434-35 (“Simply stated, the full faith and credit concept 
requires that the judgment handed down in State A be given the same effect in State B that it 
would have been given in State A . . . This means that the same preclusive effect must be given in 
terms of issue preclusion, claim preclusion, the parties or persons covered, and the issues 
involved.”). 
22. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963). 
23. JACKSON, supra note 16, at 4 (“[The Full Faith and Credit Clause] serves to co-ordinate 
the administration of justice among the several independent legal systems which exist in our 
federation.”).  See also Sedler, supra note 21, at 1537-38 (“The primary historical purpose of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause was to ensure that judgments rendered by one state court be 
recognized by another state court.”); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948) (“The full faith 
and credit clause is one of the provisions incorporated into the Constitution by its framers for the 
purpose of transforming an aggregation of independent, sovereign States into a nation.”). 
24. Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935). 
25. 210 U.S. 230 (1908). 
26. See id.  Suit was brought in a Missouri court on a claim governed by Mississippi law.  
The Missouri court misapplied Mississippi law, with the result that it upheld a gambling contract 
that was illegal (and therefore presumably against the public policy of Mississippi) under 
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is against the public policy of state two, state two must enforce the 
judgment. 
The premise that there is no public policy exception to the enforcement 
of a sister-state judgment was thrown a slight wrinkle in the United States 
Supreme Court decision Baker v. General Motors Corp.27  Because this 
case is crucial to understanding the Montana Supreme Court’s decision in 
Wamsley II, a brief summary of Baker is important.  The dispute before the 
Supreme Court in Baker centered around Ronald Elwell, a General Motor 
(“GM”) employee of thirty years.28  Pursuant to his job responsibilities, 
Elwell often helped GM lawyers in defending GM against products liability 
suits.29  Elwell’s relationship with GM “soured,” and during a deposition in 
a products liability action, Elwell testified that the GM pickup truck fuel 
system was inferior to competing products.30  Elwell soon sued GM for 
wrongful discharge and other tort and contract claims, and GM 
counterclaimed for Elwell’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty to GM.31  The 
Michigan trial court granted GM’s motion for a preliminary injunction, 
which prevented Elwell from further disclosing confidential GM 
information.32  Elwell and GM settled their dispute and entered into a 
proposed permanent injunction that was accepted by the trial court.33  The 
permanent injunction prevented Elwell from testifying in any action 
involving GM.34 
 
Mississippi law.  The Supreme Court held that Mississippi courts had to enforce the Missouri 
judgment, even though the Missouri court had misapplied Mississippi law. 
27. 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
28. Id. at 226. 
29. Id. at 227. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id.  The exact terms of the injunction prevented Elwell from: 
[C]onsulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Motors 
Corporation's trade secrets[,] confidential information or matters of attorney-client 
work product relating in any manner to the subject matter of any products liability 
litigation whether already filed or [to be] filed in the future which Ronald Elwell 
received, had knowledge of, or was entrusted with during his employments with 
General Motors Corporation. 
Id. at 227-28. 
33. Id. at 228.  The permanent injunction had two proscriptions.  The first proscription was 
essentially the same as the temporary injunction ordered by the trial court.  The second 
proscription is what ultimately caused the case to go all the way to the Supreme Court.  The 
second proscription enjoined Elwell from “testifying, without the prior written consent of General 
Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or at trial, as an expert witness, or as a witness of any 
kind, and from consulting with attorneys or their agents in any litigation already filed, or to be 
filed in the future, involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or 
designer of the product(s) in issue.”  Id. 
34. Id.  Also in the settlement agreement, Elwell and GM agreed that if a court or other 
tribunal subpoenaed Elwell to testify, his testimony at such a hearing would not violate the 
injunction.  Id. at 229. 
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Subsequently, the Bakers, who sued GM for wrongful death pursuant 
to a car accident that killed two individuals, sought to depose Elwell and 
call him as a witness at trial.35  The federal district court in Missouri 
allowed Elwell to testify and cited two reasons for this ruling:  (1) 
Michigan’s injunction need not be enforced by Missouri because enforcing 
the injunction would violate Missouri’s public policy of shielding from 
disclosure only privileged/confidential information; and (2) since Michigan 
could modify the injunction, a court elsewhere could modify the injunction 
as well.36 
After Elwell testified and a jury returned a verdict of $11.3 million, the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding the district court 
erroneously placed too much emphasis on Missouri’s public policy of 
disclosing relevant, non-privileged information, and not enough emphasis 
on Missouri’s public policy of applying full faith and credit.37  Additionally, 
the Eighth Circuit determined since no Michigan court had modified the 
injunction, it was premature for the Missouri district court to assume that a 
court in a different jurisdiction could modify the injunction.38  On appeal to 
the Supreme Court, the issue was “whether the full faith and credit 
requirement stops the Bakers, who were not parties to the Michigan 
proceeding, from obtaining Elwell’s testimony in their Missouri wrongful-
death action.”39 
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg summarized the demands of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause regarding recognition of sister-state judgments: 
A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with 
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons 
governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the 
land.  For claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes, in 
other words, the judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide 
force.40 
The Court went on to affirm the continued vitality of Fauntleroy by 
stating there is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith and 
credit due judgments.”41  While this statement is clear, the rest of Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion is rather murky.  Ultimately, the majority reversed the 
Eighth Circuit, concluding that Elwell could not be barred from testifying in 
 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 230. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 231. 
39. Id.  
40. Id. at 233 (citing cases). 
41. Id. 
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the Missouri proceeding.42  However, it is unclear on precisely what 
grounds the majority based the holding.  Justice Kennedy, writing in 
concurrence, argued that the majority need not have entered into its 
extended foray into full faith and credit jurisprudence – instead, the case 
should have been decided on narrower res judicata grounds.43  Justice 
Kennedy argued that the “beginning point of full faith and credit analysis 
requires a determination of the effect the judgment has in the courts of the 
issuing State.”44  Because the Bakers were neither parties to the Michigan 
litigation nor subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court, a Michigan 
court would not enforce the injunction against the Bakers, and thus the 
Missouri court need not enforce it against the Bakers either.45 
Unfortunately, Justice Ginsburg and the majority did not decide the 
case on those grounds, but instead created two novel exceptions to full faith 
and credit.  First, a court outside the issuing state may decline to enforce a 
judgment which purports “to accomplish an official act within the exclusive 
province of that other State[.]”46  Second, a state need not enforce a 
judgment of another state when the judgment “interfere[s] with litigation 
over which the ordering State had no authority.”47  Applying these 
“exceptions” to the Baker controversy, the majority held “a Michigan court 
cannot, by entering the injunction to which Elwell and GM stipulated, 
dictate to a court in another jurisdiction that evidence relevant in the 
Bakers’ case – a controversy to which Michigan is foreign – shall be 
inadmissible.”48 
While the majority did go on to assert that its holding created no 
general exception to the command of full faith and credit,49 legal writers 
have acknowledged that Baker created a wrinkle in full faith and credit 
jurisprudence.50  One writer observed, “Justice Ginsburg may have created 
an area of ambiguity that will, as Justice Kennedy predicts, render the 
 
42. Id. at 240. 
43. Id. at 246-47 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
44. Id. at 247 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
45. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
46. Id. at 235.  
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 239.  
49. Id. (“This conclusion creates no general exception to the full faith and credit command, 
and surely does not permit a State to refuse to honor a sister state judgment based on the forum's 
choice of law or policy preferences.”). 
50. See generally Kaleen S. Hasegawa, Re-Evaluating the Limits of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause After Baker v. General Motors Corporation, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 747 (1999); Earl M. 
Maltz, The Full Faith and Credit Clause and the First Restatement:  The Place of Baker v. 
General Motors Corp. in Choice of Law Theory, 73 TUL. L. REV. 305, 305 (1998) (acknowledging 
that “[m]ost conflicts of law scholars were undoubtedly disappointed by the majority opinion in 
Baker v. General Motors Corp.”). 
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rationale vulnerable to later misinterpretation.”51  This same writer goes on 
to prophesy that Justice Ginsburg’s murky treatment of full faith and credit 
“may mislead or even encourage later courts to decline to recognize foreign 
judgments because those judgments purportedly ‘interfered with litigation’ 
or attempted to ‘accomplish an official act.’ ”52  As we will soon see in the 
Montana Supreme Court decision in Wamsley II, this prophecy came true. 
IV. DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Suits for declaratory judgment have become a popular and less 
expensive way of resolving disputes and clarifying legal rights and 
obligations.53  It is important to note that a suit for declaratory relief differs 
in form “in no essential respect from any other action, except that the prayer 
for relief does not seek execution or performance from the defendant or 
opposing party.”54  Rather than seeking coercive relief, such as a court 
order that a defendant do something or refrain from doing something, a 
plaintiff in a declaratory judgment suit is merely seeking a declaration of 
the legal relationship between the parties.55 
The federal Declaratory Judgment Act provides:  “[i]n a case of actual 
controversy within its jurisdiction . . . any court of the United States, upon 
the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not 
further relief is or could be sought.”56  The Uniform Declaratory Judgment 
Act (“UDJA”) has similar language and was adopted by thirty eight states.57  
North Dakota has adopted the UDJA, and this fact will become important in 
this article.58 
 
51. Hasegawa, supra note 50, at 772.  
52. Id. (quoting Baker v. General Motors Corp. 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (also noting that 
ultimately, “an alter ego of the public policy exception may have been created.”). 
53. Ryan R. Dreyer, Civil Procedure—Discouraging Declaratory Actions in Minnesota—The 
Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Judgments In Light of State v. Joseph, WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
613, 618-19 (2002) (“Declaratory relief is an alternative remedy available for use in resolving 
disputes or potential disputes in a fashion that is faster, cheaper, and less harsh than coercive 
relief.”). 
54. EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 23 (1934). 
55. Id.  See also Elisabeth L. Hisserich, The Collision of Declaratory Judgments and Res 
Judicata, 48 UCLA  L. REV. 159, 161 (2000) (“Unlike coercive relief in favor of the plaintiff, 
which motivates the defendant to do or to refrain from doing something, declaratory judgments 
merely declare the legal relationships between the parties.”). 
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
57. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Extent to Which Principles of Res Judicata are Applicable to 
Judgments in Actions for Declaratory Relief, 10 A.L.R. 782 (2011). 
58. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 32-23-01 (2010): 
A court of record within its jurisdiction shall have power to declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.  No action or 
proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judgment or 
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A simple example will help illustrate the nature of suits for declaratory 
relief.  Suppose insured A has an insurance policy covering his barn from 
insurer B.  The policy provides that insurer B will pay for water damage to 
the barn.  However, the policy excludes hail damage.  Insured A brings a 
claim to insurer B, requesting B pay for damages that A incurred when a 
storm swept across the countryside, casting hail and large volumes of rain at 
his barn.  Insurer B then files a declaratory judgment action in state court in 
order to determine whether the exclusion in the policy applied to the 
damage to insured A’s barn.  Note that whatever the court decides, the 
“defendant” in the action, insured A, will not be required to do anything or 
refrain from doing anything.  In other words, insurer B is not requesting 
coercive relief but simply declaratory relief. 
After a court issues declaratory relief to a party, the question then 
becomes: what res judicata effect does a declaratory judgment have on 
further litigation?  Both the federal Declaratory Judgment Act and the 
UDJA provide that a declaratory judgment “shall have the force and effect 
of a final judgment or decree.”59  While the language of these statutes 
suggest that a declaratory judgment has the same issue preclusion and claim 
preclusion effect as any other judgment, that is not necessarily the case.  
Many courts and some scholars have distinguished between claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion when it comes to the force that a declaratory 
judgment will have in future litigation.60 
Professors Casad and Clermont have summarized the preclusive effect 
afforded declaratory judgments in subsequent actions, stating: 
A valid and final judgment in a suit solely for declaratory relief 
has two sorts of res judicata effects in a subsequent civil action.  
First, it is conclusive between opposing parties as to the matters 
declared, but it has no further claim preclusion effect and so does 
not preclude a later action for damages or other coercive relief. 
Second, a litigant is subject to issue preclusion, under the normal 
rules of that doctrine.61 
As Professors Casad and Clermont acknowledge, it is settled that 
declaratory judgments have the same issue preclusion effect as any other 
 
decree is prayed for.  The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form 
and effect, and such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or 
decree. 
Id. 
59 Schopler, supra note 57.  See also 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-23-01 (A 
declaratory judgment “shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree.”). 
60 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & EDWARD H. COPPER, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4446 (2d ed. 1986). 
61. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 190. 
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judgment on the merits.62  If this were not the case, the purpose of securing 
a declaratory judgment would be frustrated.  Litigants bring declaratory 
judgment actions to decide specific issues of law or fact; if these issues 
decided by the declaratory judgment were not preclusive in a later action, 
the declaratory judgment would be a waste of time and money.63 
While issue preclusion as applied to declaratory judgments is quite 
straightforward, claim preclusion is not.64  Professors Casad and Clermont 
assert that declaratory judgments have “no further claim preclusion 
effect,”65 and while this is mostly true, it is not entirely true.66  While some 
courts may give declaratory judgments claim preclusion effect and others 
do not, what is important to know for purposes of this article is that all 
courts recognize, at a minimum, that issues decided between two parties in 
a declaratory judgment action are preclusive between those parties in 
subsequent litigation.67 
V. WAMSLEY I AND WAMSLEY II 
With the essential understanding of issue and claim preclusion, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, and declaratory judgment actions, we turn to the 
 
62.  WRIGHT, supra note 60, § 308 (“Matters actually litigated by the parties and determined 
by a declaratory judgment are thus precluded from further litigation.”); see also Schopler, supra 
note 57, at 783 (“So far as declaratory judgments are concerned, the principle of [issue preclusion] 
applies in the same way as it applies to any other judgment.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 33 (1982) (“A valid and final judgment in an action brought to declare rights or 
other legal relations of the parties is conclusive in a subsequent action between them as to the 
matters declared, and, in accordance with the rules of issue preclusion, as to any issues actually 
litigated by them and determined in the action.”). 
63.  WRIGHT, supra note 60, § 308 (“The very purpose of [a declaratory judgment] remedy is 
to establish a binding adjudication that enables the parties to enjoy the benefits of reliance and 
repose secured by res judicata.”). 
64. Id. at 313 (“As clear as the issue-preclusion effects of a declaratory judgment may be, the 
claim-preclusion effects are shrouded in miserable obscurity.”); see also Samuel L. Bray, 
Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1293 (2010) (“Many courts and commentators 
have said that [declaratory judgments] ha[ve] the same claim-preclusive effect as any other 
judgment.  And yet this view has probably always been wrong and is certainly wrong today in the 
vast majority of US jurisdictions.  A request for purely declaratory relief has issue-preclusive 
effect for what was actually decided, at least between the parties, but it has essentially no claim-
preclusive effect at all.”). 
65. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 190. 
66. See Hisserich, supra note 55, at 173-74 (listing and discussing the states that apply claim 
preclusion to declaratory judgments and those that only apply issue preclusion); see also Dreyer, 
supra note 53, at 620 (advocating that claim preclusion should not extend to declaratory 
judgments, but recognizing that some courts do give declaratory judgments claim preclusion 
effect). 
67. See, e.g., Allan Block Corp. v. County Materials Corp., 512 F.3d 912, 916 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(“Of course if specific issues are resolved in the declaratory judgment action, their resolution will 
bind the plaintiff by virtue of the doctrine of [issue preclusion] should he later seek an injunction 
or damages.”). 
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two decisions that shall be referred to as Wamsley I68 and Wamsley II.69  At 
the center of the litigation in Wamsley I and Wamsley II was whether North 
Dakota or Montana law applied to the controversy.  Alan and Sharon 
Wamsley, residents of North Dakota, were driving their Chrysler in 
Montana when they were struck and killed by another automobile.70  At the 
time of the accident, the Wamsleys owned three vehicles, each with a 
$100,000 per person, per accident policy from Nodak Mutual Insurance 
Company (“Nodak Mutual”).71  Under North Dakota law, the policy 
coverage could not be stacked, meaning the most the Wamsley heirs could 
recover from Nodak Mutual was $200,000—the amount Nodak Mutual 
paid.72  However, under Montana law the policies may be stacked, meaning 
the Wamsley heirs could recover as much as $600,000 from Nodak 
Mutual.73 
After astute advice from their attorney, Nodak Mutual served a 
summons and complaint upon each of the Wamsley heirs dated June 4, 
2003, seeking a declaratory judgment in North Dakota that North Dakota 
law applied and stacking was not allowed.74  The summons and complaint 
was served on each of the heirs between June 4 and 18, 2003, and sought a 
judgment declaring that the Wamsley insurance policies could not be 
stacked.75  It is not clear why Nodak Mutual waited to file the summons and 
complaint in district court, but it is clear that the Wamsley heirs were 
notified by at least June 18, 2003, that Nodak Mutual believed that the 
policy did not permit stacking and that it was seeking a declaratory 
judgment to that effect. 
On June 23, 2003, the Wamsley heirs76 sued Nodak Mutual in Montana 
district court.77  On June 25, 2003, Nodak Mutual filed the summons and 
complaints it had served on each of the Wamsley heirs in North Dakota 
district court.78  The North Dakota district court granted Nodak Mutual’s 
 
68. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wamsley, 2004 ND 174, 687 N.W.2d 226. 
69. Wamsley v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co., 2008 MT 56, 341 Mont. 467, 178 P.3d 102. 
70. Wamsley I, ¶ 2. 687 N.W.2d at 228. 
71. Id. ¶ 3, 687 N.W.2d at 228. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. ¶ 9, 687 N.W.2d at 230. 
74. Id. ¶ 4, N.W.2d at 228. 
75. Id. 
76. Technically, the Wamsley estate, not the Wamsley children, brought the action in 
Montana.  However, this fact does not change the legal analysis of res judicata and full faith and 
credit, because, as the Montana court correctly articulated, the estate and the children were in 
privity.  Wamsley v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co., 2008 MT 56, ¶ 53, 341 Mont. 467, 483, 178 P.3d 
102, 114.  Thus, for simplicity sake, I refer to the Wamlsey children as being parties to both the 
North Dakota and Montana action. 
77. Wamsley I, ¶ 5,687 N.W.2d at 228. 
78. Id. 
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motion for summary judgment, holding that North Dakota law applied.79  
Therefore, Nodak Mutual had fulfilled its obligation under the insurance 
policies by paying the heirs the $200,000 policy limit on the car involved in 
the accident.80  The Wamsley heirs appealed, and the issue before the North 
Dakota Supreme Court was a strict choice-of-law issue—namely, whether 
North Dakota law or Montana law applied to the Wamsley car accident and 
resolution concerning subsequent litigation between the Wamsley heirs and 
Nodak Mutual.81  The court issued its opinion on September 13, 2003, and 
acknowledged that North Dakota followed the Leflar “significant contacts” 
test in determining what law to apply.82  The North Dakota Supreme Court 
then applied the “significant contacts” test to the dispute between the 
Wamsley heirs and Nodak Mutual, finding that North Dakota, not Montana, 
had the most significant contacts.83  The court upheld the district court’s 
judgment applying North Dakota law.84 
Meanwhile, the Montana litigation between the Wamsley heirs and 
Nodak Mutual was still brewing.  From what we know about res judicata, 
declaratory judgments, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Nodak Mutual 
should have been able to take the judgment from the North Dakota court to 
Montana, and a court in Montana should give it preclusive effect.  The 
declaratory judgment action in North Dakota reached a final, binding 
decision on the parties once the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld the 
district court.  As we know, the North Dakota judgment does not have claim 
preclusive effect on later or concurrent litigation because it was a suit for 
declaratory relief.  Nodak Mutual would not be able to use the North 
Dakota judgment to stop the Wamsley heir’s suit in Montana for damages 
or other coercive relief.  However, the North Dakota judgment should have 
issue preclusion effect for any issues that were decided—here the issue of 
what choice-of-law should apply to the controversy.  However, the 
Montana courts refused to give the North Dakota judgment preclusive effect 
in the litigation between the Wamsley heirs and Nodak Mutual in Montana, 
and the reason for this refusal goes back to Justice Ginsburg and Baker v. 
GM. 
 
79. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wamsley, 2003 WL788099, at * 3 (N.D. Dist. Ct. Oct. 7, 
2003). 
80. Wamsley I., ¶ 6, 687 N.W.2d at 228. 
81. Id. ¶ 9, 687 N.W.2d at 230. 
82. Id. ¶ 23, 687 N.W.2d at 231.  For a comprehensive treatment of the issues surrounding 
choice-of-law and the different approaches courts use in deciding choice-of-law conflicts, see 
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE (2005); CONFLICT OF LAWS 
(Richard Fentiman ed., 2005). 
83. Wamsley I., ¶¶ 9-23, 687 N.W.2d at 231-35. 
84. Id. ¶ 24, 687 N.W.2d at 235. 
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On November 9, 2005, over a year after the North Dakota Supreme 
Court’s ruling, the Montana district court rendered a final judgment against 
Nodak Mutual, holding that the Wamsley heirs could stack the insurance 
policies and Nodak Mutual was thus liable for $400,000.85  On appeal to the 
Montana Supreme Court, the court examined seven issues, but the issue 
pertinent to this discussion is whether “the District Court err[ed] by refusing 
to accord preclusive effect to the rulings from the North Dakota courts 
under the Full Faith and Credit clause of the United States Constitution.”86  
The Montana Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that 
Montana courts need not give preclusive effect to the North Dakota 
declaratory judgment.87  I argue that the Montana Supreme Court erred in at 
least three ways. 
First, the Montana Supreme Court erred by looking at the res judicata 
law of Montana, rather than North Dakota, to determine the preclusive 
effect owed to the North Dakota judgment.88  Instead, the Montana 
Supreme Court should have asked what preclusive effect a North Dakota 
court would give the North Dakota declaratory judgment.89  An analysis of 
North Dakota law proves that a North Dakota court would give preclusive 
effect to the North Dakota declaratory judgment.90  While Montana erred by 
looking at Montana preclusion law rather than North Dakota preclusion 
law, this error did not impact the outcome of the case.  The court agreed 
that the basic elements of res judicata were met by the North Dakota 
judgment, but the court found it “problematic” to enforce the judgment.91 
 
85. Wamsley II , 2008 MT 56, ¶ 2.. 
86. Id., ¶ 19. 
87. Id., ¶ 59. 
88. Id., ¶ 52 n.2 (The Montana Supreme Court recognized that “full faith and credit requires 
a sister state to give a judgment the res judicata effect it would have in the State which initially 
rendered the judgment.”  However, the court then went on to analyze the preclusive effect of the 
North Dakota judgment in light of Montana res judicata law.). 
89. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 6, at 213 (“When the prior judgment was rendered 
by a state court and the second action is brought in a court of another state, the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution requires the second court to give the same effects to a 
valid and final judgment as the judgment would have in the courts of the rendering state.”). 
90. See In Re Bjerke's Estate, 181 N.W.2d 126, 127 (N.D. 1970) (holding that a declaratory 
judgment that is final is “res judicata of the issue decided by it” and is consequently preclusive of 
the issue decided in subsequent litigation); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Mustad, 76 N.D. 84, 92 
(1948) (stating that “[t]he judgment in a declaratory action is a conclusive determination of rights, 
status, or other legal relations and carries the same weight as any other judgment under the 
principles of res judicata.”).  Both In Re Bjerke’s Estate and Great Northern Ry. Co. established 
that the issue decided in Wamsley I., namely that North Dakota law applied and stacking was not 
permitted, would be preclusive of the issue if a subsequent lawsuit between the Wamsleys and 
Nodak Mutual had been filed in North Dakota seeking to litigate the same issue. 
91. Wamsley II, 2008 MT 56, ¶ 54 (“[W]e agree with Nodak that the basic elements of res 
judicata seem to be satisfied by the North Dakota rulings.  If full faith and credit were to be 
accorded the North Dakota rulings, then theoretically after October 7, 2003, the District Court in 
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The second error the Montana Supreme Court committed was to refuse 
to enforce the North Dakota declaratory judgment based on the judgment 
being an illicit attempt to control the Montana litigation.  The Montana 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “there is no public policy exception to 
full faith and credit.”92  However, the court cited Baker for the following 
proposition:  “Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied 
enforcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish an official 
act within the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with 
litigation over which the ordering State had no authority.”93  The court then 
faulted Nodak Mutual, and by inference the North Dakota courts, for using 
the declaratory judgment to improperly apply North Dakota law “through 
the back door,” stating “[i]t is evident that the declaratory judgment in 
North Dakota was brought for the purpose of preempting the District Court 
in Montana from exercising control over the judicial processes necessary to 
resolve this dispute.”94  If the North Dakota judgment was given preclusive 
effect, the Montana Supreme Court went on, it would effectively mean “that 
the courts of [North Dakota] can control what goes on in the courts of 
[Montana].”95 
Even if Justice Ginsburg did create a novel exception to full faith and 
credit whereby a second state can refuse to enforce a judgment rendered in 
the first state which improperly interfered with litigation over which the 
first state had no authority, this limited exception should not apply in the 
context at issue in Wamsley II.  The Michigan trial court in Baker 
permanently enjoined a person from testifying in litigation anywhere in the 
country, thus affecting parties nowhere near Michigan or its jurisdiction.  In 
that situation, one could say that the Michigan court was improperly 
meddling in other court’s business.  On the other hand, the North Dakota 
district court was not improperly interfering with litigation over which it 
had no authority, but rather deciding the issue in the case that was directly 
before it. 
Furthermore, it is disingenuous for the Montana Supreme Court to state 
that the North Dakota judgment was an effort to apply North Dakota law 
“through the back door,” and preempt Montana from exercising control of 
the lawsuit filed in Montana.  Nodak Mutual sent the Wamsley heirs the 
 
Montana would be compelled to apply North Dakota law to the Estate's stacking claims.  
However, the unquestioning application of full faith and credit in this case is problematic.”). 
92. Id., ¶ 61. 
93. Id., ¶ 57 (quoting Baker v. General Motors Corp. 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998)) (emphasis 
added by Wamsley II court). 
94. Id., ¶ 59. 
95. Id., ¶ 60 (quoting Baker, 522 U.S. at 236 n.9) (bracketed text added by Wamsley II court). 
           
2013] FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 159 
declaratory judgment summons and complaint at least on or before June 18, 
2003.96  The Wamsley heirs did not file suit in Montana district court until 
June 23, 2003.97  If anyone was trying to preempt another court and get a 
certain state law to apply, it was the Wamsley heirs.  The Wamsley heirs 
knew that Nodak Mutual was going to file suit in North Dakota and thus 
quickly filed suit in Montana hoping that a Montana court would allow 
stacking.  Neither the Wamsley heirs nor Nodak Mutual should be faulted 
for their litigation tactics.98 
Finally, the Montana Supreme Court’s third error was to read Baker too 
broadly.  The Baker majority asserted that “[o]rders commanding action or 
inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister State[,]” and went on to 
hold that a Michigan court could not command Elwell to refrain from 
testifying through a permanent injunction—essentially an order 
commanding inaction.99  However, the very nature of declaratory judgments 
is that they do not command action or inaction.100  Instead, they merely seek 
a determination or answer to an issue.  Treating a declaratory judgment in 
the same manner as an injunction is simply inapposite.  Even a robust belief 
that the Baker majority created a new exception to full faith and credit 
cannot save the Montana court.  In the end, the Montana Supreme Court 
unfortunately succumbed to the predictions of Justice Kennedy and Kaleen 
Hasegawa.101 
As a thought experiment, it is interesting to ponder what effect, if any, 
a change in timing would have had on Montana’s legal obligation to give 
full faith and credit to the North Dakota judgment.  Suppose, for instance, 
that the Wamsley heirs had filed the action in Montana long before Nodak 
Mutual filed the declaratory judgment in North Dakota.  Both the Montana 
court and the Wamsley heirs would have a few different options at their 
disposal.  First, the Wamsley heirs could bring a motion in North Dakota to 
stay or dismiss the North Dakota declaratory judgment.102  Nodak Mutual 
 
96. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wamsley, 2004 ND 174, ¶ 5, 687 N.W.2d 226, 228. 
97. Id. 
98. See generaly, James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 773 (1999). 
99. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235. 
100. BORCHARD, supra note 54, at 23. 
101. Hasegawa, supra note 50, at 772 (“Justice Ginsburg may have created an area of 
ambiguity that will, as Justice Kennedy predicts, render the rationale vulnerable to later 
misinterpretation.”) (emphasis added). 
102. George, supra note 98, at 778.  Dismissals are not preferred by courts when there is 
parallel litigation, but stays are more common.  George writes: 
Upon request, a court may suspend prosecution of its own action, pending resolution 
of the other case.  If the other case becomes final (that is, it is decided on the merits by 
a competent court, and becomes final under the law of the rendering state or country), 
it should have preclusive effect as to the stayed action which can then be dismissed.  
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tried a similar tactic by filing a motion to stay the Montana legal 
proceedings while the North Dakota declaratory judgment action was 
pending.103  The Montana court did not grant the motion to stay, in part, 
because of perceived forum shopping and because the actions were filed so 
close in time.104  However, if the Montana action was filed well before the 
North Dakota declaratory judgment, it is likely that the North Dakota court 
would have granted a motion to stay or dismiss.105 
Another option to prevent the North Dakota court from reaching a 
final, binding decision would be for the Montana court to issue an antisuit 
injunction.106  This option would have been especially appealing if the 
North Dakota court refused to dismiss or stay the declaratory judgment 
action.107  An antisuit injunction enjoins an opposing party from pursuing 
the same or similar case in another state.108  While this type of injunction 
would seem to squarely violate Baker, the majority in Baker side-stepped 
the issue, writing: “This Court . . . has not yet ruled on the credit due to a 
state-court injunction barring a party from maintaining litigation in another 
State . . . State courts that have dealt with the question have, in the main, 
regarded antisuit injunctions as outside the full faith and credit ambit.”109  
Since Baker leaves open the possibility for antisuit injunctions, the Montana 
court could have tried to issue such an injunction to prevent the North 
Dakota court from reaching its final, binding decision. 
If there were a longer gap in the timing of the two competing lawsuits, 
then the problem of having two widely divergent final judgments would 
likely not have arisen.110  However, the problem arose because the Montana 
action and the North Dakota declaratory judgment action were filed mere 
days apart.  As Professor George notes, “[t]he United States Constitution’s 
strong full faith and credit mandate . . . does not apply to pending 
 
On the other hand, if the parallel case does not result in a valid and final judgment on 
the merits, then the stayed case may be revived and litigated. 
Id. 
103. Wamsley II, 2008 MT 56, ¶ 33.  
104. Id. 
105. George, supra note 98, at 782 (discussing that “[i]n many jurisdictions, a second-filed 
declaratory action is dismissed as a matter of law if it seeks no greater relief than the first-filed 
action.”). 
106. Id. at 780-81.  See John Ray Phillips III, A Proposed Solution To The Puzzle Of Antisuit 
Injunctions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 2007, 2011 (2002).  
107. George, supra note 98, at 780-81. 
108. Id. at 780. 
109. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 at 236 n.9 (citing Justice Ginsburg's past 
scholarship). 
110. See George, supra note 98, at 777-79 (discussing the various methods of resolving 
duplicative, parallel litigation, including antisuit injunctions and dismissals/stays—which have 
already been discussed—as well as other methods). 
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litigation.”111  Neither Montana courts nor North Dakota courts were 
obligated to respect or recognize the parallel litigation concerning the 
Wamsley heirs and Nodak Mutual in the other state.112  Since the actions 
were filed so close in time, neither the North Dakota court nor the Montana 
court was willing to abdicate authority to the other court.  Thus, it was truly 
a race to the finish line—the first final, binding decision of either court 
should have been res judicata on the other court.  Since the North Dakota 
court reached a valid, final judgment first, the Montana court should have 
given the judgment full faith and credit. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Declaratory judgments can be a cost-effective and time-saving method 
of determining the legal rights and obligations between parties.  A 
declaratory judgment can also help resolve and settle disputes once a final 
judgment has been issued from a court adjudicating the parties’ rights and 
obligations.  However, the benefit of a declaratory judgment vanishes when 
a court refuses to give the judgment issue preclusion effect in subsequent or 
concurrent litigation.  Instead of saving the parties’ time and money, the 
decision in Wamsley II put the Montana Supreme Court’s stamp on needless 
waste and expense in litigation. 
While the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. GM may 
have created complications, courts moving forward should not treat Baker 
as creating a new exception to full faith and credit.  Instead of treating 
Baker as creating an expansive exception to full faith and credit where a 
state “interfere[s] with litigation over which the ordering State had no 
authority,”113 courts should heed the cautionary wisdom of Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence.  If declaratory judgments are not given issue 
preclusive effect in other proceedings, then state judicial systems may not 
operate harmoniously—to the frustration of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.114  The United States Supreme Court would be wise to revisit the 




111. Id. at 820.  
112. Id. (acknowledging that unlike the rigid rules of full faith and credit, the only 
“authority” regarding parallel litigation is the “non-binding comity doctrine, which leaves state 
courts free to maintain local preferences and prejudices.”). 
113. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235. 
114. Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S 268, 277 (1935). 
